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Abstract 
Industrial Organization (IO) is concerned with the structure of industries in the economy and the behavior of 
firms and individuals in these industries. This theory has not only grown within its field, but also in others, such 
as business management especially in the areas of strategic management.  The Structure Conduct Performance 
(SCP) paradigm appears to be the most pertinent and long time used approach to assess industry structure 
studies. It basically attempts to look at the market structure of industries and determine their conduct and 
performances. Various theories that challenged the SCP are also witnessed including the efficient hypothesis, 
contestable market theory and quiet life hypothesis etc. Even in recent period, a reverse approach to look at the 
structure and performance of a given industry by observing the conduct of firms has emerged. In other words, 
the new wave of research like New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) set out to understand the 
institutional details of particular industries and use this knowledge to test specific hypotheses about specific firm 
behavior. Nevertheless, NEIO appears to be the alternate paradigm for imperfect market analysis than the one 
totally revoking the methodological approach of the SCP, in fact with friction between the two paradigms.  Some 
authors like Bhuyan (2014) has compared these two methods of analyzing market power and concluded that the 
debate over the use of the SCP approach versus the use of the NEIO approach to analyze market power will 
continue. The debate however is not only among the aforesaid paradigms but still there is unresolved 
inconclusiveness among the structural theorists like SCP and efficient market theorists. 
Keywords: Structure, conduct, performance, Industrial Organization 
 
Introduction 
The literature review begins with an outline on the definition and historical evolvement of the field of industrial 
organization up to its current state. In particular, a review on the shift in the field’s emphasis over time from the 
endeavor to address measures across industries towards more individual industry related studies. The second part 
of the review highlights key ideas on the focus of the industrial organization. The detail model of the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm is also reviewed in the subsequent section. This is followed by a review of the 
alternative structural and non-structural models of industry structure evaluation. 
 
Industrial Organization- Defining the concept 
Industrial Organization (IO) is known by several names in the literature such as ‘Economics of Industries’, 
‘Industry and Trade’, ‘Industrial Organization and Policy’, ‘Commerce’ and ‘Business Economics’ etc. 
However, several authors (Stigler, 1968, Carbal, 2000) have used ‘Industrial Organization’ as an appropriate title 
of the subject. Despite the diversity of naming, there seems a consensus on the definition and scope of IO. On 
much broader sense, authors consider IO to have concern on three areas: the firm, markets and industries. For 
instance, the most illustrious definition of IO by Stigler contains all three elements. He defined industrial 
organization as ‘the application of microeconomic theory to the analysis of firms, markets and industries’ 
(Stigler,1968, p. 1). 
Another definition with similar contextual meaning is from (Cabral, 2000) ‘Industrial organization is 
concerned with the workings of markets and industries, and in particular the way firms compete with each other’ 
(Cabral, , p.9). This definition provided more prominence to IO’s focus on the competition among firms in the 
industry. A rather more specific definition of IO is also forwarded by Church and Ware (2000). They defined IO 
as ‘the study of the operation and performance of imperfectly competitive markets and the behavior of firms in 
these markets’ (Church and Ware, 2000, p.7). The definition interestingly defined the type of market the IO 
study basically provides greater attention i.e. imperfect competitive market.  The existence of imperfect 
competition or the degree of existence of all the stated factors is a reflection of the differences in market power 
of firms in the industry.  In such regard, Church and Ware (2000) provided an alternative and very specific 
definition to IO, i.e. ‘it is the study of the creation, exercise, maintenance, and effects of market power’ (Church 
and Ware, 2000, p.31).  
The other dimension of IO definition is related to explaining the root of the field. Barthwal (2010) argues 
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that ‘IO as a field developed from microeconomics and is concerned with economic aspects of firms and 
industries seeking to analyze their behavior and draw normative implications’ (Barthwal, 2010, p. 15).  He 
explained that there are differences between those two theories. Microeconomics is formal and deductive, 
whereas, Industrial economics is less formal and more inductive. Furthermore, microeconomics is a passive 
approach with the aim of profit maximization of a company, without concerning operational aspects of the 
company. Industrial economics’ emphasis is on the operational aspect and tries to explain the working and 
changes in the existing system. His argument also get support from other authors like Ramsey (2001) who 
suggested that the focus of IO theory is on the market a company operates in, rather than the company itself . 
Ramsey (2001) supports the market focus of IO being reflected in the structure-conduct-performance model, 
which claims that there is a causal link between the structure of a market in which a company operates, the 
organization’s conduct and in turn the organization’s performance in terms of profitability. Thus, the industrial 
organization theory focuses on the whole industry and market conditions of a company. 
Shepherd (1972) further explained the difference as microeconomics typically focuses on the extreme cases 
of monopoly and perfect competition while industrial organization focuses primarily on the case of oligopoly. 
That is to mean, a competition between few firms in an industry whose number is more than one unlike in 
monopoly, but not as many as in competitive markets. 
Some authors also provided a strategy or conduct focused definition of IO. For instance, Salinger (2000) 
explained IO as the field that tries to understand the behavior of companies and what that behavior means for the 
well-being of consumers. This appears to be the area where the overlap between strategy management and 
economics was apparent. For instance Porter (1981) has used the SCP model to design its industry analysis 
model. He claimed that the central analytical aspect of IO can be used to identify strategic choices which firms 
have in their respective industry. More specifically, IO has offered strategic management a systematic model for 
assessing competition with in an industry (Porter, 1981). Church and Ware (2005) support the close association 
of the two fields of the study. The focus of the new industrial organization on the behavior /conduct of firms in 
imperfectly competitive industries involves determining the firms’ strategies to win a competitive advantage in 
the market. Therefore, IO that has a bearing on industry and firm level study appears as a theory of business 
strategy. 
 
History of Industrial Organization 
Literature shows that it is difficult to identify the exact beginnings of IO because of limited historical records on 
the field (Hamphrey, 1940).  There appear, however, some evidences according to which monopolistic practices 
and other elements of the industrial economics were in operation as far back as 2100 BC (Trucker, 2010) 
However, written records revealed that the foundation of economic theory was the book of Adam Smith in 1776 
named ‘’Wealth of Nations’’. In his economic theory, Smith (1776) discussed the principles of division of labor 
and analysis of pricing which were described by some authors like (Barthwal, 2010)) to represent the concept of 
IO.  
Corley (1990) in his article, ‘Emergence of the Theory of Industrial Organization, 1890-1990’, classified 
the history of IO into eras and referred to Marshal as pioneer to present ideas about IO. The eras incorporate: 
Alfred Marshall Era, Cournot Legacy (1890-1933), Era of Controversy (1933-1951), The Emergence of 
Industrial Organization Studies (1950s) and developments after 1960 onwards. Corley associated Marshal to the 
theory of IO due to his focus on competition and being a pioneer to integrate the concept of entrepreneur into 
analysis of firm value. ‘Marshal’s basic ideas on the firm centered around competition which he saw in terms of 
an activity or a process rather than in modern structural terms’ (Corley, 1990, p.88).  
Following Marshal (1889), Cournot formulated an economic model used to describe an industry structure in 
which companies compete on the amount of output they will produce (Hal, 2006). He began with the 
monopolistic case and progressively extended the number of producers in the market until he reached the 
opposite pole of unlimited competition. At this pole, each firm contributed too small a proportion of the whole to 
affect the going industry price. Cournot discussed duopoly, suggesting that self-interest would induce the two 
rivals concerned to reach a determinate and mutually advantageous solution. However, he failed to analyze the 
commonest market form in advanced economies, namely oligopoly (Corley, 1990). This makes it the model to 
diverge from the current attention area of the IO and the facts in the real world which is the imperfect market and 
mainly of the oligopoly. 
The developments up to 1933 were the gradual realization of the existence of an entirely new academic 
subject, the theory of the firm. Coase (1937) set out his transaction cost theory of the firm which is one of the 
first attempts to define the firm theoretically in relation to the market. His work is followed by a number 
of economic theories that explain and predict the nature of the firm and including its existence, behavior, 
structure, and relationship to the market (Demetri, 2007). Therefore, the period has diverted attention of earlier 
economists' work on corporate topics to clarify aspects of value theory. Corley (1990) named this period as ‘an 
interlude before the pace of constructive work accelerated in the 1950s’.  
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The Modern Theory of Industrial Organization 
By the end of the 1930s, the field of IO started to come together and take shape (Schmalensee ,2012).  Partly this 
was due to the influence of Edward Mason at Harvard (Mason 1939, 1957) and partly due to the industrial data 
collection and analyses practice. Schmalensee (2012) considers that in the modern era, IO economist have played 
an important role in industry studies in support of broad assertions regarding market conduct and performance.  
The modern era can also be further classified into three groups based on the dominating school of thought 
(Kovacic and Shapiro, 2000).  
 
Harvard School 
After the 1930s, scholars from the Harvard school began to focus on the structure of both firms and industry 
(Schmalensee, 2012). A notable influence from this school was from Mason (1939) who pointed out that the size 
of a firm has an impact on its competitive polices in the market. Mason (1939, p.73) explained that: 
‘‘The relative size of a selling unit, to recapitulate is one element-doubtless a very important one-in the 
structure of a firm’s market. As such it exerts an influence on the policies and practices of the firm. But 
firms of given size, relative to the extent of their markets, will follow very different price and production 
policies in different market situations.’’ 
Another significant influence is from the school has been from Bain (1951) who has assembled a sample of 
census industries and linked them to profitability data. He has found that industries in his sample with four-firm 
concentration ratios above 70 percent had distinctly high accounting profit rates than did the others (Bain,1951) 
Bain (1956) has improved such concept further in his book, ‘Industrial Organization’. He laid out 
the Structure - Conduct - Performance (SCP) which is used as an analytical framework to make relations among 
market structure, conduct and performance. Bain (1956) established that the market structure of an industry 
determines its conduct and thereby impacting firm performances. The SCP paradigm, with some further 
economics based supplements, became the basis for much of the modern version of ‘Merger Guidelines’ (White, 
2006). 
As implications of all this, Harvard School, recognizes market power as being a factor to be controlled and 
establishes a relation between the concentration ratio and its harmful effects on social welfare (Weiss,1971). The 
1960s and early 1970s saw further elaborations of the SCP paradigm and more extensive testing of the 
profitability-concentration relationship with the inclusion of entry conditions (Mann, 1966; Weiss, 1971), 
advertising (Comanor and Wilson, 1967, 1974), foreign trade (Esposito F. and Esposito L.,1971), the structural 
conditions on the buyers' side of the market (Lustgarten, 1975), risk (Bothwell and Keeler, 1975), and the 
presence of a critical concentration ratio (White, 1976). The concept of efficiency has also started to grow from 
this school. Harbison (1956) drew on the concept of entrepreneur and suggested that so called inefficiency could 
be due to entrepreneurs behaving rationally in pursuing other goals than profit maximization such as social 
advancement. Furthermore, he remarked that efficiency could also be reduced by inadequate knowledge and 
inappropriate organizational structure which could lead to loss of effective control over subordinates. These 
important ideas were further developed later (Leibenstein, 1966). He stated that ‘…the amount to be gained by 
increasing allocative efficiency is trivial while the amount to be gained by increasing X-efficiency is frequently 
significant.’ (Leibenstein, 1966,  P. 45) 
 
Chicago School 
The Chicago School counter upheaval focused on SCP, which argued that high concentration might be causing 
high profit rates, because of economies of scale (Goldschmid, 1974). A further attack to the profit-concentration 
relationship also aroused on the use and reliability of the accounting data that were used to measure the profit 
rates (Anthony, 1986; Salmon, 1985). In addition, there were critics on whether relative profit rates were even 
the appropriate indicators of market power (Fisher and McGowan, 1983). Profit-based tests of the SCP paradigm 
quickly tailed off, but were soon replaced by price-based studies drawn from individual industries (Weiss, 1989; 
Bresnahan and Schmalensee,1987). Results, however, tended to show a similar positive relationship between 
prices and market concentration. There was a general consensus among this school’s scholars that the 
relationship between market structure and performance is a reflection of the efficiency of big firms which 
allowed them to be prominent from the market (Simrlock, 1985).  In other front, Demsetz (1974) argued that the 
pragmatic relationship between profitability and concentration could be due to the large market shares of firms in 
highly concentrated industries. Therefore, the emphasis of the school seems changed in regard to price and 
efficiency theory. 
 
Game Theory  
Game theory appears as a separate topic of strategic decision making after the publication of the ‘Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior’ by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In 1950, John Nash demonstrated 
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that finite games always have an equilibrium point at which all players choose actions which are best for them 
given their opponents’ choices. Game theory received special attention in 1994 with the awarding of the Nobel 
Prize in economics to Nash, John Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. In general, the theory has provided emphasis 
on strategic decision making of the firm applying mathematical models using Nash equilibrium (Corley, 1990). 
The theory has supported some of the topics in industrial organization. These include entry deterrence; limit 
pricing and predation; theory of collusion in markets with public demand theory of sales and price wars (Bagwell 
and Wolinsky, 2000). 
 
The New Industrial Organization  
According to Tirole (1988), modern research in IO is challenged by: lack of convincing theoretical models to 
study imperfect competitive market situations and lack of quality data that limited empirical work about 
competition or industry structure. The focus of the empirical research related to industry structure mainly relies 
on cross industry analyses that established a link between industry concentration scenarios across industries with 
market outcomes (Bresnahan and Schmalensee, 1987).  Nevertheless, the aforesaid challenges later has set stage 
for a dramatic shift in the 1980s toward a specifc industry based analysis and firm behavior. This period as 
coined by Bresnahan (1989 is called the ‘New Empirical Industrial Organization’ era. The basic premise of the 
approach was the idea that cross industry variation was often going to be problematic. Therefore, the new 
research path should follow the institutional details of particular industries and about specific behavior of firms. 
Bresnahan and Schmalensee (1987, p. 21) named the move as ‘…a shift toward the firm, rather than the industry 
as the unit of observation. 
Studies frequently focus on a single industry or market, with careful attention paid to the institutional 
specifics, measurement of key variables and econometric identification issues (Weiss, 1992).  The focus on 
individual industries offers the best opportunity to understand the competitive mechanisms at work (Bresnahan, 
1989). Unlike the empirical literature on SCP, which was primarily based on cross-section studies, the New 
Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) focuses on econometric testing of particular aspects of conduct in 
single industries with the objective of detecting market power or changes in the collusive-competition behavior 
of firms (Weiss, 1971). Weiss (1971, p.398) opined that ‘perhaps the right next step is back to the industry study, 
but this time with regression in hand’. The approach entails the construction of explicit structural models that 
provide theoretical analysis of how firms in the industry would behave under different market structures 
(Comanor, 1971).  
Even though the NEIO has named as the new IO, the existing literature on market power shows that there is 
no unanimous agreement on which of these two methods should be used to analyze the market power (Bhuyan, 
2014) .For instance, much of the literature on developing countries’ experiences continues to be based on the 
SCP paradigm and even in developed countries the number of NEIO studies is far less than the number of SCP-
based studies that have been carried out thus far (Lee, 2007).  In addition, the empirical debate between the 
Chicago and Harvard schools is still hot and is reflected in research works of both developed and developing 
countries (Kapunda and Molosiwa, 2012). Most importantly, literature has not yet resolved a critical question of 
what determines industry competitiveness considering both firm strategies and market structure and this 
remained the important center area of IO. Therefore, NEIO appears to be the alternate paradigm for imperfect 
market analysis than the one totally revoking the methodological approach of the SCP, in fact, with friction 
between the two paradigms (Bhuyan, 2014). Bhuyan (2014) has compared these two methods of analyzing 
market power and concluded that the debate over the use of the SCP versus the use of the NEIO approachs to 
analyze market power will continue. 
 
Focus areas of Industrial Organization 
Shepherd (1972) more specifically considered the focus of industrial organization to assess the astonishing 
phenomenon between the two extreme market conditions i.e. competition and monopoly. He elaborated the 
concept through methodological approaches as well. 
‘‘Industrial Organization (IO) like most scientific fields has a double identity. On the one side it 
appears an abstract subject with full set of analytical concepts about the market. On the other hand, the 
topic is about real markets, teeming with the excitement and drama of struggles among real firms. The 
field applies the concepts to the reality providing meaningful insight through explaining effects and 
providing measurement and testing procedures.’’ (Shepherd, 1985, p  2). 
IO is, therefore, concerned about both markets and firms where the applicability and explanatory power of the 
theory of perfect competition is questionable. Therefore, IO analyzes empirical data on imperfect competition 
through empirical data assessment and explains the behavior and performance of both firms and the industries to 
which they belong (Caves, 2007). This suggests that the center of attention of the field relies from the 
perspective of the firm as a separate entity as well as the market in which the firm operates on. Lipczynski, 
Wilson and Goddard (2013, p. 6), demarcated the focus area of IO as: 
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  ‘‘…investigate the size structure of firms (one or many, ‘concentrated’ or not), the cause (above all 
economies of scale) of this size structure, the effects of concentration on competition, the effects of 
competition on prices, investment and innovation and so on.’’ 
Therefore, the main theme in IO includes structural analysis of the industry (including oligopoly, concentration, 
barriers to entry, performance, market structure etc). On the other front, it incorporates analysis on the theory of 
the firm (including analysis of firm strategy, pricing, product differentiation, advertising, auctions, research and 
development to mention a few (Lipczynski, Wilson and Goddard, 2013). 
As the main objective of this thesis lies on the market (industry) structure analysis, the subsequent review 
will delve into market structure and related aspect of the industrial organization.  
 
The Structure-Conduct-Performances (SCP) Hypothesis 
Mason (1937) and Bain (1956) formulated a framework for empirical analysis of the effect of market structure 
on industry performance called the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) model. The central hypothesis of the 
framework is that observable structural characteristics of a market determine the behavior of firms within that 
market, and the behavior of firms within a market determines measurable market performance (Bain, 1951).  In 
short, SCP paradigm assumes that market structure would determine firm conduct which would 
determine performance (Bain, 1956). This is a paradigm that is foundational to industrial organization economics 
(Barney, 2007). Since its conception, it has been used to analyze markets and industries, not only in Economics, 
but also in the fields of business management. For instance, the mainline of Michael E. Porter’s works on 
competition (Porter’s diamond model) are based on premises derived from this paradigm (Porter, 1981). 
Lipczynski, Wilson and Goddard (2013, p.6) stated the importance of the SCP paradigm in several ways: 
• It allows the researcher to reduce all industry data into meaningful categories ; 
• It is consistent with the neoclassical theory of the firm, which also assumes there is a direct link 
between market structure, and firm conduct and performance, without overly recognizing this link; 
• by defining a workable or acceptable standard of performance, it may be possible to accept an imperfect 
market structure, if such a structure produces outcomes that are consistent with the acceptable standard. 
By implication, market structure can be altered in order to improve conduct and performance. 
 
Assumptions of the SCP Framework 
The SCP framework posits a stable relationship and a line of causality that runs from structure through conduct 
to performance (Church and Ware, 2000). Consequently, the original SCP paradigm assumes a one-way 
relationship between structure, conduct and performance. This is the assumption that market structure determines 
market conduct and thereby affecting market performance (Roth, 2005). 
The SCP paradigm asserts that conditions of supply and demand in an industry determine its structure. The 
competitive conditions that result from this industry structure influence the behavior of companies and in turn 
dictate the performance of the industry (Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004). Therefore, the model assumes that market 
structures identified by many firms providing the same products and services, though relatively equal in firm 
size, are competitive markets generating greater performance (Carlton and Perloff, 2000). Then, the degree of 
concentration of firms’ output in a market affects the extent of competition among these firms in the industry. 
This is so because of the assumption that a more highly concentrated market structure is more likely to produce 
more effective collusion (Sathye, 2005). In other words, SCP model suggests that market concentration lowers 
the cost of collusion between firms and ends in suboptimal profits for all market participants (Bain, 1951). 
The paradigm further assumes that equilibrium states and perfect information are found in practice 
(Furguson.G and Furguson.P, 1994). As McWilliams and Smart (1995, p. 309) suggested ‘the original SCP-
paradigm is based on the assumptions that demand is known and constant and that competition is a state’. The 
underlying assumptions of the SCP approach, for example, that firms attempt to maximize profits, that firms 
have perfect information and that tastes are constant, lead to the conclusion that perfect competition is the ideal 
market structure (Roth, 2004). The market structure of perfect competition requires five necessary assumptions 
that include the following: firms sell a homogeneous product; there are a large number of small firms; firms are 
price takers; there are no barriers to entry and exit in the long run and firms and consumers have perfect 
information (Beaulier and Mounts, 2008). Obviously, these characteristics are unrealistic for most industries 
including banking. 
The degree of concentration in a market has been considered as one of major structural characteristics in the 
traditional SCP-paradigm which predicts the level of competition (Meschi, 1997). The SCP assumes that market 
concentration and level of competition are inversely related as industry concentration encourages collusion 
(Edwards et al., 2006). Methodologically, such relationship is witnessed when industry concentration and 
performance are positively related (Allen et al., 2005). In such situations, firms operating in highly concentrated 
industries will have a higher return than firms operating in less concentrated industries regardless of their 
efficiency level. Similarly, such scenario will put industry concentration to inversely relate to the welfare of the 
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consumer as well as the number of firms in the industry (Shepherd, 1985). In addition, the price of the firm gets 
closer to marginal cost if concentration falls which leads to fall in market power as well (Nguyen and Stewart, 
2013).  
The other assumption of the SCP is that the firm conduct is determined by the structure of the industry, 
hence; there will be a main linkages running from structure through conduct to performance (Bain, 1956). 
However, later critics have pointed that various feedback effects are also possible, i.e. from performance back to 
conduct; from conduct to structure and from performance to structure (Phillips, 1976; Clarke,1985). 
 
Components of the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Framework 
As outlined above, the SCP framework is mainly a composition of three core components: market structure, 
conduct and performance. Nevertheless, these elements are later expanded to incorporate public 
policy/regulation, demand and supply situations etc. 
a. Market Structure 
Conceptually, a market structure is a classification system for the key traits of a market, including the number of 
firms, the similarity of the products they sell, and the ease of entry into and exit from the market (Trucker, 2010). 
It mainly comprise the market share of its firms, and to a lesser extent, any barriers against new competitors 
(Bain, 1956). Each market structure is somewhere in the range between monopoly (a high market share and entry 
barrier) and pure competition (low share and barriers) (Shepherd, 1985). Salvatore (1998) identifies four 
different types of market organizations i.e. (a) perfect competition at one extreme, (b) monopoly at the opposite 
extreme, (c) monopolistic competition and (d) oligopoly in between. In addition, Shepherd (1985) included the 
concept of the dominant firm as a firm having 50-100% of the market and no close rival. He further classified 
oligopoly into two, i.e. tight oligopoly (the leading four firms combined share 60-100% of the market) and loose 
oligopoly (the leading four firms have 40% or less of the market). Competitive power is one of the basic criteria 
to distinguish various forms of market. However, it can be maintained that the actual market power depends on 
the competition or monopoly power. The tilt of this power determines the benefits either to the buyer or to the 
seller. The concept of a market structure is, therefore, understood as those characteristics of a market that 
influence the behavior and results of the firms working in that market (Hay and Morris, 1991).The interaction 
and differences between these behaviors and results allow for the existence of several market structures. 
Therefore, competition or market power is stated as the reason for the existence of different types of market 
structure. Thus, how such variation in market structure affects the performance of firms appeared to be the most 
important question that needs to be addressed in such regard (Mason, 1937). As explained above the main theme 
of the SCP paradigm appeasr to investigate the validity and existence of such kind of cause-effect relationships. 
In the SCP-paradigm, structure describes the characteristics and composition of markets and industries in an 
economy (Furguson,1994). Structure, therefore, incorporates those set of variables that are relatively stable over 
time and affect the behavior of sellers and/or buyers. Structure is given a broad meaning covering assortment of 
different characteristics relation both to individual firms and relationships between firms (Needham, 1970). This 
distinguished approach of definition depends on whether structure is viewed internal or external to the individual 
industry (Devine, 1976). On the one hand, structure refers to the relative importance of individual industries (or 
groups of related industries) within the economy and to patterns of transactions between these industries. On the 
other, structure is a concept derived from the received theory of the firm which analyses business behavior 
according to the structure of the market in which it operates. Therefore, structure refers to the level of seller and 
buyer concentration, the height of entry barriers and the degree of product differentiation within individual 
industry markets (Shepherd,1985). 
Literature considers the main elements that influence market structure to include such factors as seller 
concentration, product differentiation, barriers to entry and barriers to exit, buyer concentration and the growth 
rate of market demand (Lipczynski, Wilson and Goddard, 2013). Other elements of market structure exist, but 
they are usually unstable and, therefore, ignored either because they can’t be measured or because they are hard 
to observe (Belleflamme, Martin and Peitz, 2010). These factors; therefore, determine the extent of the market 
and the competition level. According to Bain (1968), seller and buyer concentrations, firm's size and entry 
conditions are the basic elements of market structure. These elements in one way or the other influence market 
integration. Seller concentration or buyer concentration inhibits the free flow of goods and services among 
markets. This in turn distorts the spirit of a unified or integrated market.  
The higher the concentration is, the closer the market would be towards a monopoly structure (Bain, 1968). 
Mohamed (2013) describes a market as concentrated if there are few number of firms in the production or there 
is an unequal distribution of the market shares. The more the concentration level of the industry, the higher 
would be the degree of monopoly and competition loss (Weiss, 1974). Low concentration of an industry 
indicates less market power held by the leading firms which empower them to consistently charge price above 
those that would be established by competitive market (VanHoose, 2009). Therefore, the industrial organization 
studies claim that market power in the hand of single producer or fewer numbers of producers, enable a
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set price above the marginal cost.   
The degree of product differentiation is another important factor since it can refer to an imperfection in the 
substitutability (to buyers) of the output of competing sellers in an industry (Lipczynski, et al; 2013). 
Differentiation is important variable affecting market structure since it could strengthen the firm’s market 
position and profit. Moreover, product differentiation can act as an entry barrier (Church and Ware, 2000).This is 
due to fact that in case of strong brand loyalty, the new entrant might be required to pay the price of convincing 
consumers to buy his/her product by offering better terms e.g. quality or price or greater advertising (Church  
and Ware, 2000).  
Similarly, if the entry condition is restricted, the biggest firm may control the entire market and this leads to 
weak performance by other firms (Bain,1968). These barriers have an effect on conduct as well as on firm 
performance because entry barriers place influence on the price setting mechanisms of established firms. In other 
words, the higher the entry barriers, the higher the limit to set prices (Carlton and Perloff, 2000). On the flipside, 
ff there are no entry barriers, existing firms in the industry cannot maintain prices above marginal costs and earn 
above normal profits. Any profits associated with non-competitive pricing would then invite entry which would 
continue until all profits are competed away (Church and Ware, 2000). Moreover, entry barriers are required in 
order to exercise market power (Tung et al; 2010). Therefore, entry barriers are one of the determining factors 
for market concentration.  
In sum, market structure is characterized by several factors that determine the level of competition and 
market power. In other words, the structural elements seem to influence strategically the nature of competition 
and pricing within the market. Therefore, the firm’s conduct should fit the characteristics of the market (Weiss, 
1978). This will directly affect the performance of firms in the industry. Therefore, studying market structure 
enables to derive the conduct of firms in the industry. Other scholars also shared the same view, for instance, 
George and Singh (1970) and Dahl and Hamxond (1977). 
b. Conduct  
In the opinion of Bain (1968), market conduct refers to the pattern of behavior followed by firms in adopting or 
adjusting to the markets in which they sell or buy. It is the way in which buyers and sellers behave both amongst 
themselves and amongst each other (Wang,2010).This happened because firms choose their own strategic 
behavior, investment in research, in development, advertising levels, collusions, etc. According to Moore (1973), 
market conduct comprises several methods practiced by traders to attract the customers to the business. It 
includes several price competition methods and non-price inducements. Purcell (1973) defined market conduct 
to refer to the actions and behavior of firms within the given structure. Pricing policies, selling cost, non-price 
competition are all some of the activities of market conduct. Therefore, market conduct resembles the behavioral 
pattern of firms in an industry. It comprises of various decision making techniques in determining price, output, 
sales promotion policies and other tactics to achieve their economic goals (Grigorova et al., 2008). Thus, given 
the structure of the market, market conduct determines firm performance. Conduct in the SCP paradigm is 
assumed to be directly influenced by the market structure (Bain, 1956).   
As conduct involves the behavior (actions) of the firms in a market, the behavior of the firm is, therefore, 
determined by the structural characteristics of the industry (Mohamed, 2013). Scherer and Ross (1990) suggest 
that conduct in the SCP paradigm is related to the firms’ product strategies, innovation and advertising. It focuses 
on how firms set prices, whether independently or in collusion with other firms in the market and on how firms 
decide on their advertising and research budgets and how much expenditure is devoted to these activities 
(Furguson ,1994). Conduct also takes into consideration the pricing strategies and product strategies of the firms 
within an industry, research and development, mergers, legal strategies, etc. and a product strategy where each 
firm is constantly attempting to develop new brands (Grigorova, 2008). These aspects of conduct are influenced 
by the structure of the market since the firm’s activities are based on the environment it is in to be successful 
(Mohamed, 2013). Lipczynski, Wilson and Goddard (2013) provide some list of elements of business conduct 
that are influenced by the structure of the market that include: business objectives, pricing policies, product 
design, branding, advertising and marketing, research and development as well as collusion and merger. They 
also provide further explanation on the elements of conduct that include the following: 
• The objective that firms pursue often is derived from structural characteristics of the industry, in particular 
the firm size distribution.  
• The extent of a firm's discretion to determine its own price depends to a large extent on the industry's 
structural characteristics.  
• Natural or inherent characteristics of the firm's basic product are likely to influence the scope for non-price 
competition centered on product design, branding, advertising and marketing.  
• Together with advertising and marketing, investment in research and development provides an outlet for 
non-price competition between rival firms. The extent and effectiveness of research and development 
investment, and the pace of diffusion  are critical determinants of the pace of technological progress  
• Collusion is another option open to firms wishing to avoid direct forms of price or non-price competition. 
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Therefore, collective decisions concerning prices, output levels, advertising or research and development 
budgets will be reached. Collusion may be either explicit (through an arrangement such as a cartel), or 
implicit or tacit (through a less formal agreement or understanding). 
• Horizontal mergers (between firms producing the same or similar products) have direct implications for 
seller concentration in the industry concerned. Vertical mergers (between firms at successive stages of a 
production process) affect the degree of vertical integration. Conglomerate mergers (between firms 
producing different products) affect the degree of diversification. Therefore, each type of merger decision 
provides an example of a conduct variable that has a feedback affect on market or industry structure. 
On the other hand, there is a strong view that firm’s conduct is able to influence the market structure. For 
instance, firms’ conduct is able to change market structure through merger process. Different mergers, horizontal, 
vertical, or conglomerate, are of different influence on the structure of market. This is because mergers between 
firms could increase market power, by increasing the market share or the entry barriers in an industry (Shepherd 
and Wilcox, 1979). Shepherd and Wilcox (1979) argue that when a horizontal merger takes place, market 
concentration increases, competition reduces and the merging firms increase their market power over prices. 
Concluding from this, one could say that together with structure, conduct defines performance. Hence, firm’s 
conduct is also capable of changing the market structure.  
c. Performance 
In the view of Bain (1968), market performance deals with the economic results that flow from the system in 
terms of its pricing efficiency and flexibility to adapt to changing situation etc. It represents the economic results 
of the structure and conduct. According to Narver and Savitt (1971), performance was the net result of the 
conduct and was measured in terms of net profits, rate of return on owner's equity, efficiency with which plant, 
equipment and other resources were used and so on. Market performance is related to market structural 
conditions and firms’ conduct with regard to pricing and product policies and profitability (Bain, 1956), 
productive and allocative efficiency (Neuberger, 1997), Growth (Lipcznski et.al; 2013) are regarded as important 
performance indicators. In terms of measurement, performance is measured by comparing the results of firms 
along the industry in relation to price, quantity, product quality, resource allocation, production efficiency, etc. 
(Neuberger, 1997). This is usually applying the accounting measures such as RoA, RoE, NIM etc. which in fact 
is subjected to several criticisms.  On the other front, market performance resembles price level, profit margin, 
level of investment, reinvestment of profit etc (Hay and Morris, 1991). In other words, through the level of 
prices, the level of profit margin etc., one can determine the degree of market integration which has a bearing on 
both the structure and conduct of firms. Therefore, the economic result of market structure and market conduct 
represents market performance. From the above observations, it can be maintained that market performance is 
the combined result of market structure and market conduct.   
d. Regulation 
Neubrger(1997) has re-modified Bain’s SCP framework by incorporating important variable in industry structure 
study and public policy. His argument relies on the fact that government policy can operate on almost all of the 
SCP variables: structure, conduct and performance variables. According to the SCP paradigm, if an industry 
comprises only a few large firms, the abuse of market power is likely to lead to the level of output being 
restricted and prices being raised above the equilibrium level (Lipczynski et.al, 2013). The stifling of 
competition is likely to have damaging implications for consumer welfare (Shafer, 2004). This suggests that 
there is a role for government or regulatory intervention to promote competition and prevent abuses of market 
power (Neubrger,1997). Lipczynski et.al, (2013) suggested that regulation involvement includes direct measures 
on market or industry structure. They pointed that competition might be promoted by preventing a horizontal 
merger involving two large firms from taking place or by requiring the break-up of a large incumbent producer 
into two or more smaller firms. Moreover, involvement might be targeted directly at influencing conduct through 
restricting a firm with market power from setting a profit-maximizing monopoly price. In addition, a wide range 
of government policy measures (fiscal policy, employment policy, environmental policy, macroeconomic policy 
and so on) may have implications on firms' performance, measured using indicators such as profitability, growth, 
productive or allocative efficiency. 
 
Competing Hypotheses 
There have been two ways of classification on the approaches and methods to assess the level of competition, 
namely, tests on structural and nonstructural characteristics (Bikker,2004). The structural methods focus on 
characteristics such as the level of concentration in the industry, the number of banks, market share, etc. (Bain, 
1951). Structural theories consist of the SCP framework and the Efficiency Hypothesis (ESH) (Bikker and Haaf, 
2001) and other variants like the quiet life hypothesis (Hicks, 1935) and contestable theory of the firm (Baumol, 
1988).  As revealed in the previous section, a useful organizing framework to think about competition and 
market power is provided by the structure conduct performance paradigm. This part of the literature considers 
other structural and non-structural competing hypotheses. 
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Efficient Structure Hypothesis  
The Efficient Structure Hypothesis (ESH) underscores that market concentration emerges from competition 
where firms with low cost structure increase profits by reducing prices and expanding market share (Simrlock, 
1985). This remains to be a competing as well as alternative rationalization for the link between industry 
concentration and performance. As proposed by Demsetz (1973) and others (Peltzman, 1977; Gale and Branch, 
1982) higher performance of firms is the result of better efficiency. The hypothesis, therefore, the assumed 
positive relationship between industry concentration-performance is much a result of gains made in market share 
by firms with superior efficiencies. The final result, then, will be an increase market concentration whose main 
source belongs to better efficiency. Hence, better profits are not because of collusive activities as the traditional 
SCP paradigm would suggest (Molyneux and Forbes, 1995). Therefore, firms with superior management or 
production technologies have lower costs of operation that apparently translated to higher profits. 
The ES hypothesis predicts that under the pressure of market competition, efficient firms win the 
competition and grow, so that they become larger, obtain greater market share and earn higher profits. As a 
result, the market becomes more concentrated (Sathye, 2005). The firms, therefore, have two options to 
maximize their profit level: they either maintain their price and reduce firm size or by lowering price and 
expanding the firm size (Williams et al., 1994). Consequently, higher profits are generated by large firms as a 
result of their superior efficiency. The main conclusion in these regard is the extra profits generated can be 
considered as an economic return and not as a return on monopoly (Chortareas et al., 2009; Seelanatha ,2010). 
Mathematically as well, the ES hypothesis posits that the positive correlation between performance and 
concentration is spurious and a positive relationship between market share (MS) and performance should be 
interpreted as the consequence of efficiency (Simrlock,1985). Philips (1976) further explained that market 
concentration and higher profitability may be the result of superior capabilities and economic efficiencies of 
firms in highly concentrated markets. A very vivid explanation of the theory of ESH is provided by Gale and 
Branch (1982, p.83) who stated that: 
 …market share, not concentration , is the primary structural determinant of profitability. Market share 
increases profits through the benefits of scale economies .In contrast, concentration affects profits by 
facilitating oligopolistic coordination. …scale economies are far more powerful than oligopoly power in 
determining profit levels…. Provisions of our antitrust laws based on presumption that concentrated market 
structures lead to resource misallocation (…)are misguided and may well be leading to decreased efficiency. 
The hypothesis has enjoyed significant support in the banking literature (Gilbert, 1984; Berger and Hannan 
,1989, 1997; Berger, 1995). Among others, Smirlock (1985) and Molyneux and Forbes (1995) showed that there 
is a spurious relationship between concentration and profitability but between profitability and the proxy for the 
firm’s efficiency measure (market share). Other studies also diverted attention towards considering the effects of 
efficiency on structure-performance relationship through explicitly estimating components of efficiency (Berger 
and Hannan, 1993; Maudos,1998; Mendes and Rebelo, 2003; Sathye, 2005; Papadoplous, 2004; Katib, 2004; Fu 
and Heffernan, 2009; Chortareas et. al., 2009; Seelanatha, 2010 etc.). The test of the ES hypothesis has been 
usually proposed in two different forms, depending on the type of efficiency considered. In the X-efficiency 
form, more efficient firms have lower costs, higher profits and larger market share, because they have a superior 
ability in minimizing costs to produce any given outputs. In the scale efficiency form, the same relationship 
described above is due to the fact that more scale efficient firms produce closer to the minimum average cost 
point (Berger and Hannan, 1993). Despite the controversies with the SCP hypothesis, the ES hypothesis has been 
tested in empirical studies in the context of a test of the SCP hypothesis (Weiss ,1974 and Smirlock, 1985).  
Therefore, ESH can be considered as an alternative interpretation to the SCP paradigm than a standalone model 
to totally disregard the SCP hypothesis. However, the debate among concentration and efficiency theories has 
not yet been satisfactorily resolved (Goddard et al., 2007). 
As discussed above, the interpretation and implications of the two approaches seem flipsides of one another. 
The efficient hypothesis claims that industry concentration lowers competition, therefore, competition and 
efficiency remain inversely related. In other words, unlike the SCP paradigm, this approach has reversed the 
causality running from efficiency to competition. In contrast, the SCP establishes that a low degree of 
competition from high industry concentration results in market inefficiency. The view apparently is unlike that 
efficient theory that posits that a market becomes more efficient as it becomes more concentrated so that anti-
concentration measures are unnecessary distortion in the economy (Goddard, 2001).  
 
Quiet Life Hypothesis 
As an extension of the structural theorists, both SCP and efficient hypothesis, Hicks (1935) came up to establish 
a relationship between industry concentration and level of efficiency. The basic premise of the quiet life 
hypothesis lies on that a banking monopoly restricts the managers’ initiatives to ensure efficiency. Hence, they 
prefer a quiet life situation free from competition. Therefore, firms operating in an increased concentration not 
only limit competition but also operate under reduced efficiency level.  Therefore, the main focus of the 
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hypothesis is on the effect of market power on efficiency. The view appears similar to the SCP but contrast with 
the efficiency theory as it presumed that competition is a driver of efficiency. Hicks (1935 p.8) explained the 
quiet life hypothesis as: 
‘‘….the subjective costs involved in securing a close adaptation to the most profitable output may 
well outweigh the meager gains offered. It seems not all unlikely that people in monopolistic positions 
will very often be people with sharply rising subjective costs; if this is so, they are likely to exploit their 
advantage much more by not mothering to get very near the position of maximum profit, than by 
straining themselves to get very close to it, The best of all monopoly profit is a quiet life.’’ 
In a concentrated market, firms do not minimize costs because of inadequate managerial endeavor, absence of 
profit maximizing conduct, lavish expenditures to obtain and maintain monopoly power and/or survival of 
inefficient managers (Berger and Hannan,1998). Under monopoly or high market power, firms and their 
managers prefer a quiet life which mathematically is observed under a negative correlation between market 
power and managerial efficiency. Berger and Hannan (1998, p.454-455) provide several justifications for the 
relationship between higher levels of market power and lower efficiency levels: 
• Firms’ discretion to levy high prices beyond the competitive levels discourages managers not to put the 
expected effort to control their costs. They prefer a quiet life that permits owners to earn price derived 
economic rents rather than the earning from effective cost control, 
• Market power also results in managerial leisure that allows them to pursue objectives other than profit 
maximization. Such situation enforces mangers to choose expense preference behavior or low risk 
taking behavior; 
• Lack of competitive environment also creates a slack in resources that will wastefully be invested to 
obtain market power. This action obviously reduces the cost efficiency but profits may be higher as a 
result of acquired or purchased market power that raises the economic rent. 
• Market power also incubates inefficient managers and allows them to persist in the system even without 
any intention to pursue goals other than maximizing firm value. Thus, ineffective managers whose main 
focus will be to protect market power resiliently operate in the system even they appear inefficient. 
In fact, there are some views which contrast the justifications of the quiet life hypothesis specifically in the 
context of the banking system. In such regard, Petersen and Rajan (1995) proposed a counter argument to the 
quiet life hypothesis due to the fact that: 
• banks with market power are associated with lower costs of borrowing and transaction monitoring. This 
advantage improves the efficiency of large banks and leads to a positive relationship between market 
power and cost efficiency.  
• market power also allows banks to enjoy greater profits which may create incentives to behave 
prudently. This behavior leads to the selection of less risky activities with lower monitoring costs.  
• banks with market power are under less pressure to increase the quality of banking services, 
consequently, decreasing the operating costs. 
The above argument contrasts the justifications of Berger and Hannan (1998) who found that quiet life effects in 
banking remained several times more substantial than the social losses from the mispricing of products arising 
from market power. However, both explanations assume that the traditional SCP paradigm holds, at least 
partially.It should, however, need to be noted that the Quiet Life Hypothesis is not a necessary part of the market 
power paradigm, but is often included in it (Shepherd, 1979).  
 
Contestable Market Theory 
The theory of contestable markets which was first introduced by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) in their 
book, ‘Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure’ stated that the threat of entry can persuade 
firms in an industry to moderate their pricing behavior. Such scenario is observed irrespective of the number of 
firms in the industry. Free entry and exit (from industry without cost) are the cornerstone of the contestable 
market theory. Therefore, as long as the market is free to enter and exit without cost, it can effectively hinder 
market monopolist to limit its greed and abandon all likely high profits to enjoy. This is explained in Baumol 
(1982, p. 3-4) as: 
‘‘A contestable market is one into which entry is absolutely free, and exit is absolutely costless. . . . the 
entrant suffers no disadvantage in terms of production technique or perceived quality relative to the 
incumbent, and that potential entrants find it appropriate to evaluate the profitability of entry in terms of the 
incumbent firms’ pre-entry prices. . . . The crucial feature of a contestable market is its vulnerability to hit-
and-run entry.’’ 
In this sense, contestability theory offers an alternative theory of natural monopoly and the way in which 
consumers’ interests are best served by the firm (Baumol, 1982). Unlike the conventional thinking, the theory 
doesn’t recommend for a regulation of the natural monopoly.  
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“The contestability theory breaks the traditional thought in arguing against presumptive 
regulation of the monopolist. If the market were contestable, the pricing behavior of the incumbent 
firm would be disciplined by the threat of entry of competitors. In other words, the threat will 
induce something approaching competitive pricing on the part of the incumbent monopolist.” 
(Bratland, 2004, p.4) 
A perfectly contestable market exists only in the presence of potential competitors who constantly seek to enter 
(exit) the market to take advantage of available profit opportunities (avoid economic loss), suggesting that 
potential competition is a crucial feature of perfect contestability (Martin, 2000).  Perfect contestability further 
assumes competitive behavior among incumbents themselves not just with respect to potential entrants. 
Therefore, contestability theory represents a distinct move away from the SCP approach to industrial 
organization theory. Amavilah (2012) maintains that true contestability exists if: 
• The profit for all firms in the industry remains zero. Therefore, a profit level exceeding zero (or a 
positive profit) motivates competition;  
• Inefficiency of any kind is not allowable. The system eliminates inefficiency as it  associates with a 
positive short-run profit;  
• Price for the outputs should always be set equivalent to the marginal cost of production and predatory 
pricing is not allowable. A price above marginal cost attracts new entrants. 
If these conditions are met, market structure, in itself will not be a worry as argued by the SCP theorists. In other 
words, high concentration will not have pressure on performance and remains a negligible case for regulatory 
intervention (Spulber, 1989,).  Regulatory involvement is needed to ensure the above mentioned conditions: 
efficiency, price and others (Amavilah,2012). 
 
Panzar and Rosse Model 
The most commonly used non-structural model in studies (especially in banking) is the Panzar and Rosse 
approach (Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1987). The models recognize that firms behave differently 
depending on the market structures in which they operate (Baumol, 1982). It also does not ignore the relationship 
between market contestability and revenue behavior at the firm level which the structural methods do (Perera et 
al.,2006). 
The model is introduced as a test for imperfect market structures applying a comparative statics from 
revenue function and factor price elasticity (Panzar and Rosse 1987). The result determines the degree of 
competition or measures the market power as well as competition conditions in a sector. Panzar and Rosse’s 
approach is based on the idea that firms employ different strategies based upon the price, in response to changes 
in input costs of the market structure in which they operate (Leon, 2014). 
In order to measure competitiveness of an industry, Panzar and Rosse (1987) had developed H-statistic 
whose value extends between −∞ to +1. The competitiveness H measure is formulated as the sum of the 
elasticities of the reduced form firm revenue equations with respect to the firm’s input prices. A perfect 
competitive market will have an h-statistic of 1 as an increase in production factor prices proportionally 
augments the revenue of the firm ensuring a long term equilibrium level of performances. In contrast, for a 
monopoly the H-statistic is inferior or equal to zero as the revenue of a monopoly negatively induces a change in 
market entry costs that proportionally increases the marginal costs and reduces production and revenue 
equilibrium. Therefore, when the costs of a company operating in a monopolistic or collusive market increase, 
this entity raises its prices, taking into account conditions proper to its situation as a monopoly, and its revenues 
diminish(Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1987; Vesala, 1995). 
The PR model can be explained by its simplicity and the fact that it does not pose stringent data 
requirements. The test can be derived by running only one equation requiring a few numbers of variables and 
banks. As a result, the PR model can be obtained from a relatively small number of observations, which is 
crucial for studies on less mature banking industry (Leon, 2014). Furthermore, Shaffer (2004) points out that the 
PR model is robust to the extent of the market as no specific market definition appears in the revenue equation. 
Only the data from firms included in the sample are required to estimate revenue equation. This is a huge 
advantage in cross-country studies (Claessens and Laeven, 2004). 
The major pitfall concerns the econometric identification and the interpretation of the H-statistic. Brandt 
and Davis (2000) show that the H-statistic can be negative in a competitive market and positive for a monopoly. 
A negative H-statistic can occur even in highly competitive conditions in the short-run with a fixed number of 
firms (Shaffer, 1983) or in the case of constant average cost (Bikker et al., 2012). Shaffer and Spierdijk (2013) 
point out that the H-statistic can be positive in highly noncompetitive settings. Furthermore, for firms facing 
constant elasticity of demand, theoretical studies report the H-statistic as alternatively increasing Shaffer (1983) 
or decreasing Panzar and Rosse (1987) function of market power. 
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Summary 
IO is concerned with the structure of industries in the economy and the behavior of firms and individuals in these 
industries. This theory has not only grown within its field, but also in others, such as business management 
especially in the areas of strategic management.  The SCP paradigm appears to be the most pertinent and long 
time used approach to assess industry structure studies. It basically attempts to look at the market structure of 
industries and determine their conduct and performances. Various theories that challenged the SCP are also 
witnessed including the efficient hypothesis, contestable market theory and quiet life hypothesis etc. Even in 
recent period, a reverse approach to look at the structure and performance of a given industry by observing the 
conduct of firms has emerged. In other words, the new wave of research like NEIO set out to understand the 
institutional details of particular industries and use this knowledge to test specific hypotheses about specific firm 
behavior. Nevertheless, NEIO appears to be the alternate paradigm for imperfect market analysis than the one 
totally revoking the methodological approach of the SCP, in fact with friction between the two paradigms.  Some 
authors like Bhuyan (2014) has compared these two methods of analyzing market power and concluded that the 
debate over the use of the SCP approach versus the use of the NEIO approach to analyze market power will 
continue. The debate however is not only among the aforesaid paradigms but still there is unresolved 
inconclusiveness among the structural theorists like SCP and efficient market theorists. 
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